



# Army Science Board 2003 Summer Study



## Challenges and Opportunities for Increments II and III Future Combat Systems (FCS)



SA to Study Co-Chairs  
MAJ John H. Grimes, ORNL

**Dr. Frank H. Akers, Jr.**

# FCS Study Team

**CO-CHAIRS**

**Dr. Robert Douglas**

Senior Government Advisors

*Dr. Larry Reeker, NIST*

*Mr. Bob Doto, CECOM*

*Dr. Don Reago, NVESD*

*Mr. Tom Pagan, SMDC*

*Mr. Jeff Paul, DARPA*



**Dr. L. Warren Morrison**

## Architecture and Information Integrity

**LTG William H. Campbell (USA, Ret)**

**Dr. Peter Lee**

LTC Mike Donovan

Mr. Alfred Grasso

Mr. Kurt Kovach

Dr. William Neal\*

Dr. Thomas H. Woteki

SA - CDT Christy Stewart

## Sensor Quality and Integrity

**Dr. Jasper Lupo**

**Dr. Edward K. Reedy**

Dr. John Blair

Dr. Rankin Clinton

Mr. Carl B. Fischer

Dr. James Richard Fisher

Dr. Valerie J. Gawron

Ms. F. Suzanne Jenniches

Dr. Reynaldo Morales

Mr. Joseph P. Santarelli

Dr. Dick Wishner

SA - Mr. Jim Wisniewski, DAS R&T

## Platforms and Weapons

**Mr. Dennis Carlson**

**Mr. Charles Vehlow**

Mr. Terry Covington

Mr. Robert G. Dodd

Dr. John Gully

*Dr. Allen Grum (BG, USA, Ret.)*

Dr. William M. Isbell

Dr. Alan Kolb

Mr. Ira F. Kuhn, Jr.

MG Fred Lawson (AUS, Ret)

*Mr. Ed Mazzanti*

Dr. Robin Murphy (AFSAB)

Mr. Bob Parker

*Mr. Bruce Tenney*

SA - Mr. Jeff Carie, TARDEC

## Operational Performance Assurance

**LTG Paul E. Funk (USA, Ret.)**

**Dr. Herb Dobbs**

Dr. John Farr

Dr. Michael W. Freeman

Mr. John Matsumura

Dr. Robert Moore

*Mr. Kenneth Morris*

Mr. William Yeakel

SA - MAJ Tom Waild, TRADOC

## Technical and Operational Red Team

**Mr. Neale Cosby**

**Dr. Laura Miller**

Dr. Jack R. Borsting

Mr. Anthony J. Braddock

Mr. Alvin R. Eaton

## RED TEAM

**Mr. George T. Singley III**

Dr. Lawrence Delaney

GEN Paul F. Gorman (USA, Ret.)

LTG Max Noah (USA, Ret)

GEN Leon E. Salomon (USA, Ret.)

LTG John Woodmansee (USA, Ret.)



# KPP to TOR Crosswalk



<b>Terms of Reference</b>	<b>Joint Inter.</b>	<b>Net B.C.</b>	<b>Netwk Leth.</b>	<b>Transport</b>	<b>Sustain/Rel.</b>	<b>Training</b>	<b>Surviv.</b>
<b>Suggest insertion priorities...</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Assure expansion of C4ISR capabilities...</b>	X	X	X				
<b>Address automating fusion, transform data into knowledge...</b>	X	X	X				
<b>Address embedded training, mission planning and rehearsal...</b>		X	X			X	
<b>Assess technologies to enable manned-unmanned collaboration</b>		X	X			X	
<b>Address achieving and assuring software integrity...</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Identify robust countermeasures (life cycle red teaming)...</b>	X	X	X				X
<b>Address reliability and industrial base matters</b>	X	X	X		X		



# Highest Priority Risks



- **Networked battle command (OF central nervous system)**
  - Bandwidth
  - Software/Middleware
  - Network degraded mode operation
- **Networked survivability**
  - Trades to meet weight goals
  - Off-ramp readiness to fight
  - Dependence upon deep targeting and precision engagement
- **Transportability: Power projection**
  - Current vehicle weight projections and historical weight growth
  - C-130 limitations



# Increment I Spirals



- **Joint Interoperability for Network Centric Survivability and Lethality**
- **Networked Survivability**
- **Bandwidth Campaign**
- **Smart Antennas**
- **Middleware/Software**
- **Transparent Battle Space**
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- **KPP 1,2,3,7**
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- **KPP 2,3,7**
- **KPP 5**




# Joint Interoperability for Network Centric Survivability and Lethality



- **Global Information Grid (GIG) connectivity to the edge**
  - Assured and ubiquitous communications from the most forward edges of the battlefield to the global information grid, connecting dispersed forces into a cohesive joint force
- **Networked lethality**
  - Assured reach-back for timely joint precision fires
  - Lethality/collateral damage
- **Networked survivability**
  - Leverage of joint ISR assets
  - Benefit from killing first



# GIG Connectivity to the Edge



## Findings

- Multi-tiered, layered communications is essential
- Adaptive Joint C4ISR Node (AJCN) and Terahertz Operational Reachback (THOR) are developing enabling technology
- No transition program identified

## Recommendations

- PEO C3T deploy AJCN payloads on UAVs and aircraft e.g., KC-135 (Increment I)
- CECOM and PEO C3T leverage THOR (Spiral 1)

## Payoff

- Joint Interoperability
- JTRS and WIN-T range extension
- Dedicated complement to SATCOM



# Networked Lethality



## Musts

- **Be highly responsive (goal ~ seconds)**
- **Leverage joint fires (e.g., air delivered)**
- **Tailorable to target set. Variety of munitions available:**
  - Small warheads for low collateral damage (e.g., AF small diameter bomb)
  - Loitering overhead for short time of flight (e.g., AF LOCAAS; USN AWS)
  - Highly maneuverable for urban canyons
- **Precise**

## Findings


- **AF and Navy ahead of Army in loitering munitions**
- **Loitering Attack Munition (LAM) is currently deferred; Mid-range munition underfunded**
- **Army missiles oriented on anti-armor. Improvements needed:**
  - Agility for urban canyons
  - Advanced warheads (e.g., thermobaric, novel explosively formed penetrators)



# Dismounted Networked Lethality



- Key elements of FCS that are highly useful to dismounted infantry were deferred
- Wide array of networked distributed lethality options for urban and complex terrain engagements needed



**Clear need for a formal development effort for Distributed Dismounted Lethality comparable to the mounted FCS including the ability for robust urban operations while avoiding direct fire engagements where possible and winning these engagements when avoidance is not possible.**



# Recommendations: Networked Lethality



- **Work with AF and Navy regarding joint fire doctrine. Fold this into evolving FCS O&O (TRADOC/LSI; Now)**
- **Continue to develop and field LAM. Leverage insofar as possible AF and Navy investments (Army S&T; Spiral 1)**
- **Begin exploratory program on advanced lethality (propellants, warheads, maneuverability, etc.) (Army S&T; Spiral 1)**
- **Accelerate Mid-range Munition (MRM); field with Full Operational Capability (FOC) UA (Army S&T; with first UA)**
- **Establish a non-lethal weapon thrust with USMC-led Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program (Army S&T; Spiral 1)**
- **Establish a dismounted networked lethality thrust (Army S&T; with first UA)**
- **Fund PEO Soldier now – Target Geolocation & Designation for loitering munitions; standoff breaching munitions; smart rounds**



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# Networked Survivability

Deter Enemy with Assured Revenge  
Kill (All Arms)

Don't Fight Alone!  
UE and Joint Capabilities

Find And Kill Enemy Before Detection

Robotics, Lethality Thrusts, Sensors & Sensors Web

Don't Be Detected  
Enabling Materials, Signature Management

Don't Be Hit  
KE & CE Active Protection

Don't Be Killed  
Insensitive High-Energy Munitions  
Vehicle Protection  
S/L Analysis & Human Factors

Don't Be Penetrated  
Vehicle Protection, Composites Applications, EM Armor, Personnel Protection, Enabling Materials

Future Combat Systems



# Networked Survivability Enablers



## Joint Force

- Full spectrum low latency Army and joint lethality
- Networked battle command and lethality (Army fires, JDAM, LGB, arc light and joint loitering munitions LOCAAS, AWS, etc.)

## Unit

- Sensor nets provides synoptic situation awareness, (take advantage of change detection and tracking); use robots to take risks and hits; Loitering missile available to prosecute in seconds

## Platforms

- Multimode, multifaceted survivability suite

## Revenge Kill

- Integrate sensor web for localization, specialized “warfighting rules” and rapid fires application



# Recommendations: Networked Survivability



- **Kinetic energy active protection and electromagnetic armors**
  - Army S&T complete technology development (PM FCS transition and field; Spiral 1)
- **Unit, section, platform survivability campaign**
  - Establish campaign concept and initial local warfighting rules and use of layered capability (including revenge kill) (UAMBL and LSI; Now)
  - Expand sensor web concept to provide focus on survivability; Experiment with possible solutions (UAMBL, C3OTM); Transition into FCS program (PM FCS and LSI; Spiral 1)
  - Revenge kill should be explicit part of networked battle command (PEO GCS; Now)




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
# Bandwidth Challenge



- Army/FCS bandwidth requirements growing (e.g., >>20Mbps for UA)
- OF needs voice, data, imagery and video distribution in near real time
- Joint, interagency and multi-national competition for spectrum (e.g., AF)

- Spectrum crowded and oversubscribed - Fixed allocations inefficient
- Conventional spectrum planning overly complex
- Dynamic tools lacking

*Air Force Projected Tactical Data Link Growth*





# Adopt Bandwidth Efficient Strategy



- **Control bandwidth demand**
  - Optimize packets/update rate, on-board processing, data compression
- **Spectrum management**
  - Adopt dynamic assignment and policy management strategies
  - Introduce DARPA's "XG" dynamic spectrum usage into FCS Network Management in 2010 spiral
- **Time and space utilization**
  - Introduce bandwidth enhancements from DARPA's FCS Communications and Army's MARCON-i STO during 2010 spiral
  - Extend JTRS frequency range above 2 GHz for Wideband Network Waveform
  - Establish program for asymmetric transmission with small up-links and robust down-links (e.g., DIRECT/TV/PC)
  - Employ adaptive and directional antennas



# Recommendation: Bandwidth Campaign



- **Assign “Bandwidth Campaign” mission to Army CIO now**
- **Roles and responsibility**
  - **Ensure electromagnetic spectrum is managed as precious and limited resource**
  - **Ensure Army acquisition is consistent with campaign plan**
  - **Influence DoD initiatives to support Army needs (e.g., transformational communications)**
  - **Plan for the continual growth in bandwidth requirements**
  - **Ensure information distribution and access efficiency**



# Increment I Spirals




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# Smart Antennas to Provide Breakthrough Capabilities



- Opportunity to move aggressively to objective capabilities
- Enables distributed, multi-functional operations
  - Each platform contributes to communications, active protection, EW, SIGINT, deception, radars
  - Multiple combat platforms acting as a “team;” networked operations eliminate dedicated single function platforms
- Leap ahead - bandwidth, range, anti-jam, reliability, multi-function





# Antenna Recommendations for Implementation in Baseline



- **Develop protocols and open standards for JTRS and WIN-T to accommodate “smart antennas” (ASAALT; Now)**
- **Extend JTRS and WIN-T software architecture to manage distributed antennas (ASAALT; Now)**
- **Accelerate investment in network control, integrated waveform/protocol development (ASAALT/DARPA; 04)**
  - CERDEC MARCON-i , MOSAIC, DARPA FCS Comms and MIMO BAA
- **Invest in RF components to reduce ESA cost (ASAALT; Now)**
- **Aggressive SiGe program: “Antennas on a chip” (ASAALT or DARPA; Now)**
- **Evaluate and verify progress through trials, experiments and test (ASAALT/LSI; Now)**
  - Restructure the C3OTM test-bed to support technology maturation, development of TTPs for training insights



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# Risk: Unprecedented Scale and Complexity



Manned & Unmanned Platforms

Mounted Combat System

NLOS Cannon






ICV

UAV






Small Man-packable UGV







Computer Hardware



**SoS COE**  
*(Middleware)*




Mission Application Software



Future Combat Systems



# System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SoS COE)





Future Combat Systems



# SoS Validation through Continuous Experimentation and Testing



By: Conducting scaled systems level experimentation and testing



**AAE and CG TRADOC should take ownership now**

**Integrated with FCS System Integration Laboratory**

And by: Enhancing and leveraging Army's simulated test and experimentation environments



# FCS Software: Recommendations



- **Within the FCS community, adopt open source SW development for SoS COE, including development of supporting tools e.g., CM tools, security (LSI; Now)**
- **Establish FFRDC “SoS COE Blue Team” for controlled intellectual competition, leveraging existing models, e.g., Intel Community’s S&T Expert Partnership (AAE; Now)**
- **Establish Army S&T Program to leverage middleware advances in DARPA and NSF programs (e.g., DARPA MoBIES, PCES) (AAE-FY04)**
- **Continuous “non-attribution” experimentation to gauge progress and optimize warfighting effectiveness of FCS SW**
  - **Utilize existing constructive/virtual/live environments integrated with the FCS SIL**

**The Army’s “Bolder Stroke”**



# Increment I Spirals




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
# Sensor Panel KPP Summary



KPP	Threshold	Spirals	Objective
#1 - Joint Interoperability	100% Top IER	Information Exchange Requirements	100% IER
#2 - Networked Battle Command	Situational Awareness	Smart Sensor Webs FOCAM Urban Combat Sensors	Fused COP
#3 - Networked Lethality	Chap 4 LOS, BLOS & NLOS	Sniper detection/engagement	Autonomous B/N/LOS
#4 - Trans	ECC C5/RORO Intra 500 NM	Essential Combat Configuration, High Speed Sealift, Roll-on Roll-off	ECC HSS Intra 1000 NM
#5 - Support & Reliability	95% OA -30% Stryker	Operational Availability	99% OA -85% Stryker
#6 - Training	TESS IAW CTIA	Tact Engagement Simulation System Common Training Instruction Architecture	TESS IAW CTIA & JIS
#7 - Survive	HEAT @ xxM 30mm Sabot	Urban Combat Sensors Advanced countermine (imaging technology) FOCAM	KE @ xxM 45mm Sabot



# Transparent Battle Space



**Nowhere to hide**



# Smart Sensor Webs

## Situational Awareness Through Netted, Processed, Sensor Arrays





### Applications


- Urban canyons
- Subways & sewers
- Rural terrain and roads
- Heavily foliage
- Real time target tracking

### Functionality

- Self organizing, Info filtering
- Comms and Geo-location
- Publish / Subscribe concept




- Organic & external reports
- Blue force position
- SALUTE reports



**Performs fusion locally to generate a tactical picture**



# Foliage Penetration SAR & 3D LADAR



Foliage Penetration



Data combined from multiple viewpoints





# Urban Combat

## “See Everywhere - All the Time”



- **Virtual presence**
  - Early seamless integration of intelligence
  - Persistent, ubiquitous, dynamic, volumetric imaging and video
  - Viewpoints from any angle
- **See behind walls, detect mines & tunnels**
  - “Through-the-walls/windows” standoff sensors
  - Counter-sniper system
  - Imaging ground penetrating radar
  - Seismic and acoustic imaging



“Nowhere to hide”



# Sensor Recommendations



- **Smart sensor web**
  - Integrate available sensors with embedded processing (PEO FCS & LSI; Spiral 1)
- **Foliage penetration, counter camouflage RADAR and 3D LADAR,**
  - Complete DARPA, ARL and CERDEC FOPEN and 3D LADAR S&T program (Director, DARPA and CERDEC; Spiral 1)
- **See-through-wall RADAR adapted to UAV/OAV**
  - Complete efforts at DARPA and in Army S&T [Director, DARPA & DASA (R&T)]
  - Transition to FCS (PEOs GCS, IEW&S, Aviation, and LSI; Increment II)
- **Counter-sniper system**
  - Integrate available technology including prototypes (i.e., SMDC Overwatch, CERDEC) (PEOs GCS and Soldier and LSI; Increment II)
- **Counter-mine system**
  - Integrate available technology to provide rapid and sure detection (air/ground) of mines and booby traps (PEOs Ammo and IEW&S; Spiral 1)



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


# SoS Reliability



## Issue

- SoS must
  - be reliable
  - possess redundancy
  - degrade gracefully
  - have a fail safe mode
  - be able to recover quickly
  - be low latency



## Findings

- Traditional platform way of thinking not applicable – must be viewed from a SoS operational effectiveness perspective
- Information, human, hardware, software and organizational performance in combination will all dictate SoS reliability and readiness




# SoS Reliability



## Recommendations

- Relationship between reliability and SoS readiness must be modeled and understood now
- PM FCS and LSI should
  - develop candidate metrics for SoS reliability and readiness
  - consider contractor incentive for reliability
  - model the role of information quality, assurance, and service on reliability and readiness
  - provide FCS UA and UE reliability and readiness definitions - now





# Vision for Increment II: a New “Top Four”



## Top Four

1. Air deployment and maneuver
2. Unprecedented protection – DE Wpns
3. Pervasive robotics
4. 10x training

## Enables ~

- Forced entry
- Over the shore logistics
- Eases weight constraint
  
- Bottomless magazine
- Engaging unengagable targets
- Dial-a-lethality
  
- Find and hold threats at risk
- All class of dirty, dangerous, dull tasks
- Autonomous
  
- Be all you can be!

**“Delivering step function increase in capabilities”**



# Management Initiatives



- **Unit managed readiness**
- **Experimentation/modeling and simulation (survivability of small units)**
- **Life-cycle Red Teaming**



# The DARPA Role in Spirals - Major!



## Spiral

Joint interoperability for network centric survivability and lethality

Integrated survivability

Bandwidth campaign

Smart antennas

Middleware/Software

Transparent battle space

System of systems reliability

## DARPA Contribution

AJCN  
THOR  
UCAR

Urban combat (tbd)

FCS comms  
MIMO

SiGe antenna

Middleware research

Sensor webs  
See-thru-walls  
MANTIS

## New Ideas?

Non lethal weapons  
Highly maneuverable weapons

Soldier survivability

Mine detection

Understand problem



# FCS Spiral Development Challenge



- **Unprecedented opportunity for transition of technology, subsystems and prototypes in an integrated spiral development process**
- **We need DARPA to maintain commitment to develop innovative, high risk, high payoff technologies for transition to FCS**
- **Spiral development processes must be developed in parallel with experimentation technology and prototype development**

**Successful spiral development requires stakeholders to bridge the gap between S&T and SDD to provide needed objective capability**



# Takeaways






- **Manage highest priority risks**
  - Networked battle command
  - Networked survivability
  - Transportability: Power projection
- **Apply technology spirals across the total force**
- **Expand experimentation to define and develop DOTLMPF spirals**
- **Refocus transformation management**



# Backup



# Joint Transport Rotorcraft (JTR) Provides FCS Mounted Vertical Maneuver to Operational Depth



## JTR is Required for the Army, Marines, & SOF

- **Fixed Wings:**
  - Must use APODs
  - Cannot unload ships
- **Rotary Wing:**
  - Evolutionary designs do not meet needs

Only the JTR can provide the FCS the capability for vertical mounted maneuver to operational depth



# Directed Energy Weapons



- **Supports a variety of functions**
  - Air defense (e.g., rockets)
  - Counter RSTA
  - Disable booby traps
  - Aircraft protection
- **Bottomless magazine**
- **Instantaneous effect**
- **Dial-a-lethality**
- **Element of information warfare**





# Pervasive Robotics




RSTA





Attack



Maneuver Support



Maneuver Sustainment



**Army begins campaign to incorporate unmanned systems multi-role for RSTA, weaponization, maneuver support and sustainment functions**



# 10X Training: Tying it all Together



**Embedded training**

**+**

**Multi-player wars (scenarios) over the net**

**+**

**Individual performance monitoring**

**+**

**Cognitive learning processes designed to specific tasks**

**+**

**Individualized unit and soldier training packages**

**Across the total force**



# Recommendations: 10X Training



## Findings

- Does not include all components of UE SoS, e.g., CS and CSS
- Collective training requires high overhead and is not persistent
- Automated performance assessment not embedded

## Recommendations

- Include all elements of UE SoS in embedded training architecture (G8/LSI; Now)
- Leverage online gaming technology for collective training environment (Army S&T; Spiral 1)
- Embed automated performance assessment in C4ISR and training architecture (Army S&T; Spiral 1)
- Research cognitive learning processes based on complex FCS tasks and prepare individualized training for units/soldiers (Army S&T; Increment II)



# Unit Managed Readiness (ASB SS 2002)



## Issues

- **UA will**
  - Be technologically sophisticated and highly complex
  - Face diverse, adaptive threats
- **UA will require**
  - Cohesive teams of leaders and led
  - High-aptitude, cross-trained, well-rehearsed soldiers
  - Continuous learning to evolve joint interoperability

## Finding

- **Neither present leader development program or current individual replacement system are well suited to address above issues**

## Recommendation

- **Adopt from the onset unit managed readiness for FCS UA (G1; Now)**



# Land Warfare & Joint Experimentation



## Recommendations

- **Develop a transformation experimentation plan**
- **Establish a permanent organization to experiment and work in DOTLMPF (TRADOC/LSI/Dir OF, now? Spirals...). Key functions:**
  - **Develop and validate the joint tactical operational rules**
  - **Establish and maintain an experimentation “core cadre”**
  - **Program funding for experimentation**
  - **Provide mechanism to equip soldiers with mature technologies**
- **Use C3OTM and JPSD as basis for building experimental organization**
- **One or two company size unit(s) with hooks to battalion elements**
- **Composition/focus changes over time**



# Life Cycle Red Team



## Functions

- Conduct analytical OPFOR-like missions against the FCS SoS
- Conduct technical assessments
- Design longitudinal scoreboard based on objective capabilities

## Benefits

- Ensure long term survivability of system of systems
- Provide life cycle feedback on capabilities

## Recommendations

- Establish independently funded FCS Red Team reporting directly to the Secretary of the Army (VCSA; Now)
- Actively integrate (intel, testing, training, ops, signal, joint, etc.) red-teaming into FCS development process in accordance with draft OSD “Best Practice Guide” (Red team; ASAP)